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Trade costs are often cited as an important determinant of the volume of trade. This paper 
provides enough evidences to ascertain that today’s trade issues in Northeast Asia go beyond 
the traditional mechanisms of tariffs, and include “behind-the-border” issues. By estimating a 
modified gravity equation, controlling for endogeneity and remoteness, we find that variations 
in transaction costs along with trade infrastructure facilities have significant influence on 
regional trade flows in Northeast Asia. On average, 10 percent saving in transaction costs 
increases imports by about 5 percent in Northeast Asia. This paper concludes that when tariffs 
tend to become low in Northeast Asia, the economies in this region could potentially benefit 
substantially from higher trade provided trade costs are well controlled. 
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1. Introduction  
 
A growing literature has documented the impact of trade costs on the volume of trade.
1 Most 
of these studies show that integration is the resultant of reduced costs of transportation in 
particular and other infrastructure services in general.
2 The shared objective of economic 
integration, in general, is to reduce trade barriers – visible and invisible.
3 Direct evidence on 
border costs shows that tariff barriers are now low in most countries, on average (trade-
weighted or arithmetic) less than 5 percent for rich countries, and with a few exceptions are 
on average between 10 to 20 percent for developing countries (Anderson and van Wincoop, 
2004). Poor institutions and poor infrastructure penalize trade, differentially across countries. 
Therefore, today’s trade strategy goes beyond the traditional mechanisms of tariffs and quotas 
and includes “behind-the-border” issues, such as the role of infrastructure and governance in 
supporting a well-functioning trading economy.
4 The attention is now being focused on 
minimization of trade costs through facilitation of merchandise and services trade logistics, 
both inbound and outbound. Given this awareness, trade costs are, therefore, cited as an 
important determinant of the volume of trade.
5 
 
In our particular case, the three Northeast Asian countries, namely, China, Japan and Korea, 
together contain more than 1.46 billion population (23 percent of world population), and boast 
a GDP of US$ 6.32 trillion (17 percent of world GDP) in 2005. Japan and Korea are termed 
as high-income economies, whereas China is seen as lower middle-income country.
6 While 
Korea is becoming a mature economy, catching up Japan, China, on the other, has emerged as 
an engine of growth, not only for the Northeast Asia, but also for the entire world. The 
extensive trade among China, Japan and Korea has demonstrated broader prospects for 
regional cooperation. In 2005, China has become the largest trading partner of Korea and 
second largest trading partner of Japan. A remarkable growth in China’s two-way trade with 
Korea and Japan has resulted in robust growth of the economies in Northeast Asia. However, 
Northeast Asia is still characterized by its low level of regional integration, despite the fact 
that the economies in the region are complementary to a large extent and could potentially 
benefit substantially from deeper economic integration.
7  
 
                                                 
1 Refer the study Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), which has elaborately covered the major studies 
carried out on this subject.  
2 In traditional trade theory it is customarily assumed that trade takes place between countries which 
have no spatial dimensions. Correspondingly, locational problems have also been neglected in the 
theory of customs unions. In 1961, Bella Balassa, the then associate professor at the Yale University, 
published a book entitled The Theory of Economic Integration. Even though very few are aware of it, 
this book, which is very popular till today, propounded the view that success of global trade is 
characterized by ‘economic distances’ among the trading pairs. This is not to deny whole set of other 
works started with Paul Samuelson in 1952 till Andrew Rose in 2006. All these led to generate a new 
chapter in international trade theory, in which the success of trade liberalisation can only be attained if 
countries control ‘non-price factors’ of trade, or alternatively ‘trade costs’. 
3 One set of ‘invisible’ barriers are dealt through measures in trade and business facilitation. The 
‘visible’ set of barriers, which are often cited as physical or infrastructure barriers, are dealt through 
transport facilitation measures. 
4 For instance, many studies show that liberalisation of international transport services foster 
international trade very much the same way as tariff liberalization does (Baier and Bergstrand, 2001; 
Andriamananjara, 2004). 
5 The costs appearing from the barriers in trade can be termed as ‘trade costs’, which is measured as the 
mark-up between export and import price, where this mark-up is roughly indicate the relative costs of 
transfer of goods from one country to another thereby can be commented as an approximation to 
indicate the Balassa’s ‘economic distance’. 
6 According to World Bank (2005) 
7 Progress towards forming regional economic bloc in Northeast Asia has always been very slow since 
its inception. According to Yip (2001), Northeast Asian regionalism has been delayed owing to 
political factors rather than economic reasons.   2
In recent years, Northeast Asia has received growing attention as a region that has 
successfully begun the process of integration into the global as well as neighbouring regional 
economies.
8 Considering the increase in trade interdependency of the three economies in 
Northeast Asia
9, the need for an FTA in the region has gained high momentum in recent 
years. This has been reflected in a growing number of studies conduced in last few years 
aiming to find out the feasibility of an FTA in Northeast Asia.
10 Latest is Lee (2005), which 
using CGE Model, shows that the integration through trade (read, FTA) in Northeast Asia 
would lead to GDP growth of 5.15 percent for Korea, 1.54 percent for China and 1.21 percent 
for Japan, and all taken together is likely to generate economic welfare of US$ 30 billion in 
the region (Lee, 2005).  
 
The noticeable development is that without having any regional trade agreement (PTA or 
FTA), the tariff barriers among the three countries in Northeast Asia have become low; 
weighted average tariff in 2004 of the three economies was less than 6 percent, as compared 
to more than 20 percent in 1991, with a few exception of China’s average 40 percent tariff on 
imports from Japan and Korea in 1991. Over time, tariff has been reduced to a great extent in 
this region such that the regional trade volume in Northeast Asia increased from US$ 56 
billion in 1991 to US$ 325 billion in 2004.
11 However, despite higher intraregional trade 
observed in Northeast Asia, there is no evidence towards lowering costs of trade in the region. 
For example, bilateral transaction costs between China and Japan has been hovering around 
27 - 28 percent for the last one and half decade, while the same between Korea and Japan is 
found to be around 2 - 4 percent.
 12 Apparently, it seems that the regional trade would have 
been much higher had the costs of trade among the three countries were low along with 
reduced tariffs.  
 
Some studies have indicated that the cost of trade facilitation, specifically trade 
documentation and procedures, is high, between 4 to 7 percent of the value of goods shipped. 
In 1996, APEC conducted a study that highlighted the gain from effective trade facilitation. 
For example, the gains from streamlining customs procedures exceeded those resulting from 
trade liberalization, such as tariff reduction. Gains from effective trade facilitation accounted 
for about 0.26 percent of real GDP of APEC members (about US$ 45 billion), while the gains 
from trade liberalization would be 0.14 percent of real GDP (about US$ 23 billion).
13 
According to World Bank, raising performance across the region to halfway up to the level of 
the APEC average could result in a 10 percent increase in intra-APEC exports, worth roughly 
US$ 280 billion (World Bank, 2002). In a different way, Djankov et al. (2006) indicated how 
                                                 
8 In view of recently concluded East Asia Summit 2005, Northeast Asian countries are now looking 
towards deeper trade integration with ASEAN. An FTA among ASEAN+3 will lead to welfare gain of 
approximately US$ 129 billion (Yungling, 2005).  
9 For a detailed study on trade interdependency in Northeast Asia, refer Lee (2005). According to Lee 
(2005), trade concentration ratio in Northeast Asia increased from 1.09 in 1990 to 1.65 in 2004, which 
was even higher than that of EU since 2001.  
10 Refer page 31 of Lee (2005) to know the list of studies which have dealt the feasibility of FTA in 
Northeast Asia. Also refer, Cheong (2005). 
11 The share of intra-regional trade in Northeast Asia has increased from 12.40 percent in 1990 to 23.90 
percent in 2004 (Lee, 2005). 
12 In a study, De (2004) shown that for most Asian countries, trade cost works as a strong barrier to 
trade integration than tariff. By estimating a structural Gravity model of economic geography using 
cross-country data on income, infrastructure, transaction costs and trade of selected Asian economies, 
De (2004) provided evidence that transaction cost is statistically significant and important in explaining 
variation in trade in Asia. In addition, this study also found that port efficiency and infrastructure 
quality are two important determinants of trade costs. 
13 Similar indications were obtained for countries in APEC (Cernat, 2001, World Bank, 2002; Wilson 
et al, 2003)   3
time delays affect international trade. According to them, on average each additional day that 
a product is delayed prior to being shipped reduces trade by at least 1 percent.
14  
 
Although the systematic development of trade facilitation in Northeast Asia has for some time 
been an important consideration, there is clear lack of broader policy framework which is 
required for long term development. Moreover, there is a dearth of studies to focus on the 
causality of factors required for trade facilitation policy framework. The question then arises: 
how do the non-price determinants of international trade such as infrastructure and transaction 
costs affect integration of the Northeast Asia? This paper attempts to find out the answer to 
the above question with following reasons.  
 
First, the reason for focusing on trade costs in Northeast Asia is pressing if we look at the 
region’s trade coverage. When most of the Northeast Asian economies – either through 
ASEAN+3 or through APEC or combination of both
15– are planning to promote regional 
trade, integration of the whole region is likely to be limited due to lack of an integrated and 
improved transportation and customs.  
 
Second, since the countries in Northeast Asia are planning to intensify economic cooperation 
through bilateral FTAs (China-Korea, Korea-Japan, China - Japan), trilateral FTA (China-
Japan-Korea), inter-regional FTA (ASEAN+3) and multilateral FTA (WTO), these countries 
should display smaller trade costs. These FTA events are expected to put added competitive 
pressure on Northeast Asian economies, particularly on trade and through which investments.  
 
Third, to gain anything from liberalised trade regime in Northeast Asia, there is an urgent 
need to control trade costs, which might not only multiply the welfare emanating from 
liberalized trade environment but also strengthen the trade capacity of the region in the era of 
globalization. Gaining a fair idea about trade costs will help dealing its components more 
accurately.
16   
 
Fourth, while the rhetoric of trade costs has proved very appealing to common people, the 
analytical basis for the concept is somewhat unclear. If trade between two countries (or 
among a group of countries) normally raises real income in both; does it mean anything to say 
that countries may not have to deal with trade costs separately as if these are by default taken 
care by production costs? Several studies, mostly in context of EU and WTO, show that it is 
possible that a trading economy(s) may hurt if trading costs are not dealt separately, 
particularly when there exists structural (artificial or natural or both) asymmetries within or 
between the trading pairs.  
 
                                                 
14 This was estimated by the authors through a structured Gravity model using newly constructed 
Doing Business Database of the World Bank on shipment of cargo from the factory gate to the ship in 
126 countries.  
15 Some of the Northeast Asian countries are also members of other extra-regional arrangements too. 
For example, three Northeast Asian countries, are members of APEC, and two of which (China and 
Korea) are also member of Bangkok Agreement, now renamed as Asia Pacific Trade Agreement 
(APTA). 
16 For example, trade facilitation issues, which can be termed as a component of trade costs, are being 
used differently in literature dealing with WTO issues, which again are very narrow in a sense to deal 
the barriers to trade in goods and services. According to World Bank, “there is no standard definition of 
trade facilitation. In a narrow sense, trade facilitation simply addresses the logistics of moving goods 
through ports or more efficiently moving customs documentation associated with cross-border trade. In 
recent years, the definition has been broadened to include the environment in which trade transactions 
take place, including the transparency and professionalism of customs and regulatory environments, as 
well as harmonization of standards and conformance to international or regional regulations.” (World 
Bank, 2006a)   4
Therefore, this study is an attempt to assess the impact of trade costs on regional trade in 
Northeast Asia, and propose policy measures that would facilitate trade in the region. The 
remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 deals with the definition of trade costs 
and its relevance. Data and methodology are dealt in Section 3. Section 4 describes the broad 
profile of trade and trade costs in Northeast Asia. Section 5 provides some estimates for the 
impact of trade costs and discusses the results. Finally, conclusions are briefed in Section 6.  
 
2. Definition of Trade Costs and Its Relevance 
 
Broadly defined trade costs include all costs incurred in getting a good to a final user other 
than the marginal cost of producing the good itself: transportation costs (both freight costs 
and time costs), policy barriers (tariffs and non-tariff barriers), information costs, contract 
enforcement costs, costs associated with the use of different currencies, legal and regulatory 
costs, and local distribution costs (wholesale and retail). Trade costs are reported in terms of 
their ad-valorem tax equivalent. In Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2004) term: the 170 percent 
‘representative’ trade costs in industrialized countries breaks down into 21 percent 
transportation costs, 44 percent border related trade barriers and 55 percent retail and 
wholesale distribution costs (Figure 1). 
 
In general, an exporter or importer incurs trade costs in all the phases of the export or import 
process starting from obtaining information about market conditions in any given foreign 
market and ending with receipt of final payment. One part of the trade cost is trader specific 
and depends upon his operational efficiency. The magnitude of this trade cost diminishes with 




Figure 1: Estimated Trade Costs in Industrialized Countries 
 
Notes: *Tax equivalent of the time value of goods in transit. Both are based on estimates for US data. 
** The combination of direct observation and inferred costs, which, according to author, is an 
extremely rough breakdown.  
Source: Drawn from Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) 
                                                 
17 Despite the structural differences, trade costs are often termed as transaction costs in literature. We 
avoid dealing with indirect trade costs, such as auxiliary transaction costs, which exporters incur in 
terms of speed money (bribes) and delays. The auxiliary transaction costs represent real resource cost 
as well as costs that may just be ways of sharing the economic rents. For example, delay on the road, in 
































(3%)   5
The other part of trade costs is specific to the trading environment and is incurred by the 
traders due to in-built inefficiencies in the trading environment. It includes institutional 
bottlenecks (transport, regulatory and other logistics infrastructure), information asymmetry 
and administrative power that give rise to rent seeking activities by government officials at 
various steps of transaction. This may cost traders (or country) time and money including 
demurrage charges, making transactions more expensive.  
 
Trade costs are large, even aside from trade policy barriers and even between apparently 
highly integrated economies. In explaining trade costs, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) 
referred the example of Mattel’s Barbie doll, discussed in Feenstra (1998), indicated that the 
production costs for the doll were US$ 1, while it sold for about US$ 10 in the United States. 
The cost of transportation, marketing, wholesaling and retailing represent an ad-valorem tax 
equivalent of 900 percent. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) commented: “Tax equivalent of 
representative trade costs for rich countries is 170 percent. This includes all transport, border-
related and local distribution costs from foreign producer to final user in the domestic 
country. Trade costs are richly linked to economic policy. Direct policy instruments (tariffs, 
the tariff equivalents of quotas and trade barriers associated with the exchange rate system) 
are less important than other policies (transport infrastructure investment, law enforcement 
and related property rights institutions, informational institutions, regulation, language).”  
 
Direct transport costs include freight charges and insurance, which is customarily to the 
freight charge. Indirect transport user costs include holding cost for the goods in transit, 
inventory cost due to buffering the variability of delivery dates, preparation costs associated 
with shipment size (full container load vs. partial loads) and the like. Indirect costs must be 
inferred. Alongside tariffs and NTB’s, transport costs look to be comparable in average 
magnitude and in variability across countries, commodities and time.  
 
Trade costs have large welfare implications. Current policy related costs are often worth more 
than 10 percent of national income (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2002). Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(2000) commented that all the major puzzles of international macroeconomics hang on trade 
costs. Details of trade costs also matter to economic geography. For example, the home 
market effect hypothesis (big countries produce more of goods with scale economies) hangs 
on differentiated goods with scale economies having greater trade costs than homogeneous 
goods (Davis, 1998). The cross-commodity structure of policy barriers is important to welfare 
(e.g., Anderson, 1994). 
 




Costs imposed  
by policy 
Costs imposed by 
environment 
Tariffs*  NTBs  Quota  Transport costs  Miscellaneous 
costs 
Direct costs  Indirect costs 
Freight charges  Insurance  Transit costs  Pre-shipment costs  6
In this study, we deal with only those components of trade costs which are imposed by both 
policy (tariff) as well as environment (transport and others). Figure 2 shows the components 
of trade costs we are dealing in this study. In this paper, we term the costs imposed by 
environment as transaction costs.  
 
3. Methodology and Data
18 
 
This study is undertaken in two stages. First, we provide some estimates of trade costs at 
regional (pooled) level. We stress that the specification of the gravity equation, together with 
the choice of the distance measure, are crucial for evaluating the size of the barriers. Second, 
we assess the impact of trade costs on regional trade based on a panel data, controlling for 
endogeneity and remoteness, following which, policy conclusions are drawn.  
 
3.1 Measuring Transaction Costs  
 
Despite a wide range of theoretical derivations of the gravity equation, the majority of the 
authors do not model transport costs explicitly, exceptions being Bergstrand (1985, 1989), 
Davis (1998), Deardorff (1998), Limao and Venables (2001), Fink et al., (2002), Clark, 




To estimate bilateral transaction cost in this study, we have followed the model introduced by 
Limao and Venables (2001), following the difference of cif (cost, insurance and freight) and 
fob (free on board) values.
20  
 
Importing countries report the value of imports from partner countries inclusive of cif, and 
exporting countries report their value on fob, which measures the cost of the imports and all 
charges incurred in placing the merchandise aboard a carrier in the exporting port. Let Tij 
denotes the unit cost of shipping a particular good from country j to country i. We suppose 
that it is determined by: 
 
Tij= f (xij, Xi, Xj, µij) (1) 
 
where xij is a vector of characteristics relating to the journey between i and j, Xi is a vector of 
characteristics of country i, Xj is a vector of characteristics of country j, and µij represents all 
unobservable variables. 
                                                 
18 This paper has two distinct methodological improvements over De (2006a, 2006b). First, we estimate 
a modified gravity equation, controlling for endogeneity and remoteness. Second, choice of the model 
(random and/or fixed effect) was based on a series of scientific tests, as described in Section 5. 
19 However, except Limao and Venables (2001) and De (2004), none has incorporated both 
infrastructure and transport costs in the model. 
20 Many measures have been constructed to measure transport cost. The most straightforward measure 
in international trade is the difference between the cif and fob quotations of trade. The difference 
between these two values is a measure of the cost of getting an item from the exporting country to the 
importing country. See, Brakman, Garretsen and Marrewijk (2001). There is another source to obtain 
data for transport costs from industry or shipping firms. Limao and Venables (2001) obtained quotes 
from shipping firms for a standard container shipped from Baltimore to various destinations. Hummels 
(2001a) obtained indices of ocean shipping and air freight rates from trade journals which presumably 
are averages of such quotes. Due to data limitations and the very large size of the resulting datasets, 
direct methods are best but not always feasible here. The most widely available (many countries and 
years are covered) is average ad-valorem transport costs are the aggregate bilateral cif/fob ratios from 
UN’s COMTRADE database, supplemented in some cases with national data sources. Nevertheless, 
because of their availability and the difficulty of obtaining better estimates for a wide range of 
countries and years, apparently careful work such as Harrigan (1993) and Baier and Bergstrand (2001) 
used the IMF (COMTRADE) database.   7
Denoting the fob price shipped from j to i by pij, we define tij, the ad-valorem transaction cost 
factor, as  
 
tij = cifij / fobij = (pij + Tij) / pij = t (xij, Xi, Xj, µij) (2) 
 
where the determinants of Tij are given in equation (1). The ratio of cif/fob provides the 
measure of transaction costs on trade between each pair of countries. Assuming that tij can be 
approximated by a log linear function up to some measurement error, the average observed 
transaction cost rates tij appears as follows. 
 
ln tij = α + β xij + γ ln Xi + δ ln Xj + ωj   (3) 
 
Following Limao and Venables (2001), in terms of the data, tij  corresponds to the ratio 




ji) -1] for importing country i. The ratio (cif/fob – 1) represents the 
ratio of unit transaction costs to the fob price and thus provides a simple summary statistic of 
the transaction cost on imports. As pointed out by Limao and Venables (2001), cif/fob data 
does contain information about the cross sectional variation in transport costs, and that results 
from using this data are quite consistent with those obtained from the shipping cost data.
21  
 
Here, the transaction costs, TC
t
ij (= tij) represents costs of transaction between country i and j 
for the period t, IM
t
ij stands for import (cif) of country i from country j for the period t, and 
EX
t
ji denotes export (fob) of country j to country i for the period t. 
 
3.2 Measuring Trade Infrastructure  
 
Country’s infrastructure plays vital role in carrying trade, which has been widely dealt in 
many studies. For example, by incorporating transport infrastructure in a two-country 
Ricardian framework, Bougheas et al. (1999) have shown the circumstances under which it 
affects trade volumes.
22 According to Francois and Manchin (2006), transport and 
communication infrastructure and institutional quality are significant determinant not only for 
country’s export levels but also for the likelihood exports. Nordås and Piermartini (2004) 
shown that quality of infrastructure is an important determinant of trade performance wherein 
port efficiency alone has the largest impact on trade among all indicators of infrastructure.  
 
The infrastructure variables have explanatory power in predicting trade volume. Limao and 
Venables (2001) emphasized the dependence of trade costs on infrastructure, where 
infrastructure is measured as an average of the density of the road network, the paved road 
network, the rail network and the number of telephone main lines per person. A deterioration 
of infrastructure from the median to the 75th percentile of destinations raises transport costs 
by 12 percent. The median landlocked country has transport costs which are 55 percent higher 
than the median coastal economy.
23 Inescapably, understanding trade costs and their role in 
determining international trade volumes must incorporate the internal geography of countries 
and the associated interior trade costs.  
                                                 
21 However, cif/fob ratio has some drawbacks. The first is measurement error; the cif/fob factor is 
calculated for those countries that report the total value of imports at cif and fob values, both of which 
involve some measurement error. The second concern is that the measure aggregates over all 
commodities imported, so it is biased if high transport cost countries systematically import lower 
transport cost goods. This would be particularly important if we were using exports, which tend to be 
concentrated in a few specific goods. It is less so for imports which are generally more diversified and 
vary less in composition across countries (Limao and Venables, 2001). 
22 Bougheas et al. (1999) estimated augmented gravity equations for a sample limited to nine European 
countries. They included the product of partner’s kilometres of motorway in one specification and that 
of public capital stock in another and found that these have a positive particle correlation with bilateral 
exports.  
23 Limao and Venables (2001) also reported similar results using the cif/fob ratios of the IMF.   8
Therefore, for country characteristics, we have focused on infrastructure measures – the 
country’s ability to enhance the movement of merchandise. To assess impact of infrastructure 
facilities on bilateral trade, we have constructed trade mobility index (TMI), comprising nine 
infrastructure variables for each individual country.
24 TMI is designed to measure the costs of 
travel across a country.
25  
 
3.3 The Augmented Gravity Model  
 
In order to explore the impact of trade costs on trade flows, our empirical analysis has 
considered an augmented gravity model since it is one of the popular partial equilibrium 
models known in explaining the variation of trade flows. The gravity model provides the main 
link between trade barriers and trade flows.
26 The augmented gravity model considered here 
uses a balanced panel data for the period 1991 to 2004 on trade, distances, gross domestic 
product (GDP), GDP per capita, infrastructure, openness, exchange rate, tariff, and 




We look at the trade flows by estimating a gravity model including income, infrastructure and 
host of institutional and economic variables as reported above. Since the gravity equation is 
the standard analytical framework for the prediction of bilateral trade flows, we apply panel 
data policy simulation technique rather than extending it for forecasting purposes. The gravity 
equation which we have estimated in log-linear form takes following shape. 
 
                                                 
24TMI was constructed based on UNDP method. TMI measures the relative position of a country 
considering a set of observables. Index is calculated following general formula: Index = [(Actual – 
Minimum) / Maximum – Minimum)]. While indexing the infrastructure stocks of the countries, we 
have considered following nine variables: (i) railway length density (km per sq. km of surface area), 
(ii) road length density (km per sq. km of surface area), (iii) air transport freight (million tons per km), 
(iv) air transport, passengers carried (percentage of total population), (v) aircraft departures (per 
airport), (vi) container traffic (per port), (vii) fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 
people), (viii) internet users (per 1,000 people), and (ix) electric power consumption (kwh per capita). 
There are several other methods to construct an index, such as multivariate factor analysis, which can 
also be attempted to measure the infrastructure stock alternatively. Due to limitation of space, we have 
avoided placing TMI and corresponding weights. Interested readers may contact author for the same.  
25 In theory the fob and cif prices are border prices and thus it would seem that own and trading partner 
infrastructures as defined here should not affect these rates. It is possible that there are interactions 
between the variables. The simplest example is that an increase in land distance should increase the 
cost of going through a given infrastructure. 
26 The gravity model has been used extensively in social and behavioural sciences. In analogy to the 
Newtonian gravity model, James Q. Stewart (1947, 1948) found strong correlations for traffic, 
migration, and communication between two places, based on the product of the population size and 
inversely related to their distance squared. This model became popular in the hand of Jan Tinbergen 
(1962) when it was applied to international trade. Since then the gravity equation has become a 
standard analytical tool for prediction of bilateral trade flows with simultaneous development of its 
theoretical discourse. Although there is debate about its theoretical support, the gravity equation is one 
of the most empirically successful in economics. It relates bilateral trade flows to GDP, distance, and 
other factors that affect trade barriers. It has been widely used to infer trade flow effects of institutions 
such as customs unions, exchange-rate mechanisms, ethnic ties, linguistic identity, international 
borders, and so on and so forth. See, for example, Anderson (1979), Deardoff (1998), Hummels (1999), 
Baier and Bergstrand (2001), Limao and Venables (2001), Glick and Rose (2002), Fink et al (2002, 
2005), Wilson et al, (2003). 
27 By taken both tariff and transaction costs, we cover a major portion of trade costs. Ideally, no study 
has attempted so far to capture all the components of trade costs associated with country’s exports and 
imports. Due to absence of data, we have avoided taking NTBs in this study, though exists among the 
three countries.    9
ln IM
t
ij  =   β1 ln GDP
t
i + β2 ln GDP
t
j + β3 ln GDPPC
t
i + β4 ln GDPPC
t
j + β5 ln 
TMI
t
i + β6 ln TMI
t
j + β7 ln ONS
t
i + β8 ln ONS
t
j + β9 ln TC
t
ij +β10 ln 
T
t
ij + β11 ln ER
t
i + β12 ln ER
t
j + β13 ln R
t




where i and j are importing and exporting country respectively, IM
t
ij represents import by 
country i from country j, GDP is country’s gross domestic products, taken at constant US$, 
GDPPC stands for country’s per capita gross domestic products, considered in constant US$, 
TMI represents country’s trade mobility infrastructure, ONS is country’s openness, measured 
in terms of trade as percentage of country’s GDP, TC
t
ij stands for transaction costs for 
bilateral trade between countries i and j for the period t, T
t
ij stands for bilateral tariff (weighted 
average) between country i and j for the period t, ER represents exchange rates of country i 
and country j, R represents average remoteness of country i for the period t,
28 D ij is the 
distance between countries i and j, and t denotes trading years (t = 1991,…. 2004).
29 The 
parameters to be estimated are denoted by β and eij is the error term.
30  
 
There are few important reasons for considering the equation (4). First, we estimate a 
modified gravity equation, controlling for endogeneity and remoteness. Second, the variables 
are identified keeping in mind their importance in influencing bilateral trade. Third, we can 
estimate elasticity of trade flows with respect to exogenous variables. Fourth, a country’s 
trade with any given partner is dependent upon its average remoteness to the rest of the world 
(Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). Studies that do not control for remoteness produce 
biased estimates of the impact of transaction costs on trade. Finally, in an attempt to minimize 
the possibility of endogeneity bias we also estimate equation (4) instrumenting transaction 
costs. We use number of ports in bilateral pairs as instrument mainly for two reasons: (i) 
being geographically separated, countries rely more on seaports for merchandise trade, rather 
than overland, and (ii) due to spatial distribution, number of seaports are unlikely to be 
affected by the total volume of import in a given pair.  
 
3.4 The Data 
 
The dataset includes bilateral trade between three Northeast Asian economies for the years 
1991 to 2004. Given the dataset, there are 84 unidirectional trading pairs and 13 variables that 
make the dataset as 1092 pooled observations. Table 1 presents correlation coefficients 
among the dependent and independent variables. Tariffs, transaction costs, exporting 
country’s trade mobility index are all negatively correlated with imports and highly robust.  
 
The major sources of secondary data are collected from many sources such as United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
World Bank (WB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), and United Nations Statistical Division 
(UNSD). Data specific sources are briefed in Appendix 1. 
 
                                                 



















, where dij is 
the distance between countries i and j, C is the number of countries, Yw is World GDP, taken here at 
constant price, Yj and Yi are GDPs of countries i and j, taken at constant prices, respectively.  
29 We do not include common language or currency or PTA/FTA dummy because the countries 
considered in this paper do not share such characteristics.  
30 In case of random effect model, we define the error term, e
t
ij = αi + ω
t
ij, where αi represents the 
variations in trade flows due to the unobserved differences, and the random error term, ω
t
ij, which is 
assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0. In case of fixed effect model, αI is considered 
independently but not as a part of the error term (e
t
ij).   10















































Note: * Significant at 1 percent level  
 
4.  Overview of Regional Trade and Trade Costs in Northeast Asia 
 
In Northeast Asia, China is seen as an industry-driven economy, whereas Korea and Japan are 
services driven. Services sector in Korea and Japan presently contributes over 60 percent to 
GDP, whereas the industry contributes over 50 percent to GDP in China. Virtually, 
contribution of services sector to GDP in China has been found as static during 1991 to 2003. 
However, agricultural sector’s contribution to GDP in all the three countries has declined over 
the period 1991 to 2003. The bigger but less developed economy (China) is industry driven, 
whereas relatively advanced economies (Japan and Korea) are services driven. Even though 
the momentum of growth in GDP and GDP per capita in all the three countries has been 
slowed down since 2001, the trade has surged up. An outcome of aggressive industry-driven 
development strategy, particularly in China and Korea, is reflected in rising production and 
expansion of exports, and positive current account balance, thus generating employment, 
raising wages, and thereby gradually catching up higher income countries. 
 
Table 2: Trends in Regional Trade in Northeast Asia 
1991 2001  2004  Particulars  
  US$ billion 
China's Export to Japan  10.25  45.08  73.51 
China's Import from Japan   10.03  42.81  94.37 
China's Total Trade with Japan  20.28  87.89  167.89 
Japan's Export to China  8.60  30.95  73.92 
Japan's Import from China   14.25  57.78  94.34 
Japan's Total Trade with China  22.85  88.73  168.25 
China's Export to Korea  2.18  12.54  27.82 
China's Import from Korea   1.07  23.40  62.25 
China's Total Trade with Korea  3.24  35.94  90.07 
Korea's Export to China  1.00  18.19  49.76 
Korea's Import from China   12.80  13.30  29.58 
Korea's Total Trade with China  13.80  31.49  79.35 
Japan's Export to Korea  20.09  25.29  44.25 
Japan's Import from Korea   12.38  17.22  22.06 
Japan's Total Trade with Korea  32.47  42.51  66.31 
Korea's Export to Japan  12.36  16.51  21.70 
Korea's Import from Japan   21.12  26.63  46.14 
Korea's Total Trade with Japan  33.48  43.14  67.85 
Note: Consider export at fob and import at cif prices 
Source: IMF (2005)   11
Trade in the region (among China, Japan, and Korea) has rapidly increased over the last 
decade. Countries are now more open than they used to be a decade earlier. Rising regional 
trade shows higher trade openness in Northeast Asia. Table 2 indicates that trade among these 
three countries has gone up substantially over last one and half decade. In 1991, the total 
intraregional trade in Northeast Asia was US$ 56 billion, which grew 37 percent per annum 
since 1991 and became US$ 324 billion in 2004. The share of the intraregional trade in 
Northeast Asia has also increased from 13.90 percent in 1991 to 23.90 percent in 2004 
(Figure 3). It has increased steadily since 1991 except for the years of the Asian financial 
crisis. In fact, intraregional trade in Northeast Asia is fast catching up with those of the EU 
and NAFTA. At the country level, Korea’s trade with China and Japan has increased twice 
faster than her trade with other countries during 2000 and 2004, whereas Japan’s intraregional 
trade increased five times faster than its trade with other countries in the same period. Since 
the intraregional trade has intensified in Northeast Asia during 1991 to 2004, in order to gain 
larger from the trade settings (global and regional), there is an urgent need for free trade 
among the three countries in Northeast Asia. In particular, the trade concentration ratio in 
Northeast Asia crossed that of the EU, without any formal regional agreement (Lee, 2005).  
 
China’s robust trade performance and rapid economic growth have made a strong impact on 
the regional trade structure over time in Northeast Asia. These countries do more trade among 
each other compared to their trade with rest of the world (Hai and Zhang, 2004). Gradually, 
Japan and Korea have become China’s second and forth largest trading partners in 2004 
respectively, whereas China and Korea are Japan’s second and third largest trading partners, 
following the United States in the same year. In case of Korea, China and Japan are the first 
and third largest trading partners, respectively. Therefore, considering the increase in trade 
interdependency of the three countries in the Northeast Asia, the need for an FTA has 
increased substantially.  
 
In general, China and Korea heavily rely on Japan for intermediate products (and also raw 
materials and technology) and for market of their finished products. Although trade in the 
region is well diversified, trilateral trade structure among China, Korea and Japan has been 
quite similar to each other. For example, four products (HS 84, 85, 87, 90) of top 10 bilateral 
trade items between China and Japan overlapped in 2004. Similarly, six items (HS 27, 29, 72, 
84, 85, 90) out of top 10 bilateral trade items between China and Korea overlapped in the 
same year. The same also holds true in case of trade between Japan and Korea. Eight of the 
top 10 trade items between Korea and Japan overlapped (HS 27, 29, 39, 72, 84, 85, 87, 90) in 
2004. Tables reported in Appendix 2 capture this trend briefly.  
 
The manufacturing sector has an overwhelming stake in trade in Northeast Asia. In 2004, 
manufacturing products constituted 93.40 and 92.00 percent of Korea’s exports and imports 
to and from China, and 73.00 percent and 97.10 percent to and from Japan, respectively (Lee, 
2005). Among the manufacturing sector, six industries, namely, electronics, automobile, 
general machinery, textile, steel, and petrochemicals, share the lager pie. These six industries 
constitute 3/4
th of Korea’s and Japan’s exports and 2/3
rd of China’s exports in intraregional 
trade among Korea, China and Japan (Lee, 2005). Also, in total exports, electronics (28.80 
percent), textiles (26.10 percent), general and machinery (23.20 percent) have the highest 
shares, in that order. Excluding petrochemicals (15.50 percent), the rest five industries have a 
higher market share in the world market than the overall market share (15.80 percent) of the 
three countries. One of the reasons for rising trade in manufacturing industry is the rapid 
development of China’s heavy and chemical industries and the rapid increase of Korea’s and 
Japan’s trade with China after 2000. Therefore, it may be concluded that regional trade 
interdependence has become very high in Northeast Asia, which has evolved over time, 
perhaps, due to less policy barriers (tariffs, for example) in the region. But has that also been 
associated with low trade costs?  
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Northeast Asia 13.90 14.10 16.10 17.50 18.60 19.00 18.60 17.40 19.20 20.30 21.80 22.40 23.70 23.90
NAFTA 38.90 39.70 41.00 42.40 42.00 43.50 44.50 45.70 46.80 46.90 46.6 46.10 44.90 43.60
EU 64.70 65.20 60.50 60.90 61.60 60.80 59.60 60.50 61.80 59.80 59.40 59.90 60.40 59.80
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Source: Lee (2005) 
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Notes: 1. Cross-section pooled data for the period 1991 to 2004. 2. TC 
represents transaction costs, calculated based on the methodology as shown in 
Section 2. 2. Imports, tariffs and TC are based on bilateral trading pairs.  
 
To answer this, we have plotted trade, tariff and transaction costs in a scatter plot for the panel 
of 1991 to 2004 in Figure 4, which shows that despite lower tariffs, trade in Northeast Asia is 
still associated with high transaction costs, which, in other words, indicates that even though 
the regional trade has gone up over time in Northeast Asia with substantial reduction in 
tariffs, the cost of trade in the region has seen no substantial fall. Perhaps, rise in costs of 
trade being an outcome of rising international freight costs has an impact on trade and trade 
equivalent to tariffs or even the exchange rate. A reduction in the cost of transport directly   13
stimulates exports and imports, just as an increase in the exchange rate makes exports more 
competitive, and a reduction in national tariffs lowers the cost of imports. This is more 
amplified in Table 3, which shows bilateral imports, transaction costs and tariffs for two 
cross-section years, 1991 and 2004.  
 
Spurred by trade liberalization, all the three countries are now having lower tariffs (Table 3). 
In fact, tariffs have dropped to levels where in many cases any additional reduction would 
now no longer have a significant impact. However, movement towards lowering transaction 
costs varies across the three countries. While, in one hand, China’s imports from Korea and 
Japan have gone up substantially during 1991 to 2004 along with substantial fall in tariffs, on 
the other, China’s bilateral import costs from Korea have increased from 6.40 percent in 1991 
to 25.09 percent in 2004, and from 16.58 percent in 1991 to 27.67 percent in case of imports 
from Japan. Merchandise trade between Japan and Korea and Korea and China indicate fall in 
tariffs and transaction costs, and rise in trade during 1991 and 2004. In the case of exports of 
China and Korea to Japan, for example, tariffs have reached to an average of 1.53 percent 
(Korea), and 3.65 percent (China), compared with a 28.32 percent share accounted for 
transaction costs in case of China and 1.66 percent in case of Korea. However, the movement 
of transaction costs do not change much even if we consider distance-weighted transaction 
costs (TCw). It follows the same direction indicated in un-weighted transaction costs (TCn) 
among the three countries. 
 
What is interesting is that Korea’s transaction costs in 2004 were found even much lower than 
her import tariffs, both in cases of her imports from China and Japan. There is no substantial 
fall in tariffs in Korea for her imports from China, but her transaction costs for import from 
China has gone down substantially during 1991 to 2004 due to which bilateral trade between 
the two countries has gone up much faster than their trade with rest of the region. If Korea’s 
geographical location (distance) in the region is a vital factor for her ability to control the 
transaction costs, the country’s performance in trade enhancement by way of improved 
associated infrastructure facilities is also praiseworthy. On contrary, the trade between China 
and Japan is associated with high transaction costs.  
 










  (%) 
1991 China  Korea  0.24  6.40  0.007  41.80 
2004  China Korea 4.19 25.09  0.026 6.21 
1991 China  Japan  2.23  16.58  0.008  41.80 
2004  China Japan  6.35 27.67  0.013 6.41 
1991 Korea  China  1.11  57.91  0.061  11.40 
2004 Korea  China  4.81  6.35  0.007  11.28 
1991 Korea  Japan  6.80  5.14  0.004  11.40 
2004  Korea Japan  7.50  4.29 0.004 4.45 
1991  Japan China 0.34 38.98  0.019 7.51 
2004  Japan China 1.90 28.32  0.014 3.65 
1991  Japan Korea 0.29  0.20 0.001 6.58 
2004  Japan Korea 0.44  1.66 0.001 1.53 
Notes: 1. Bilateral imports, as percentage of GDP. 2. Normal bilateral transaction 
costs, expressed in terms of percentage of total import without controlling distance. 
3. Weighted bilateral transaction costs expressed in terms of percentage of total 
import controlling distance. 4. Weighted average tariff 
Sources: Calculated based on WB WITS, UN COMTRADE, and IMF DOTS 
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This calls for further investigation of sector-wise transaction costs, as bilateral transaction 
costs are aggregative in nature. In order to capture sector-wise transaction costs, we have 
considered HS 4 digit products. Tables 4, 5 and 6 provide the top 10 import items, ranked in 
terms of import volume in bilateral pairs in Northeast Asia for 2001 and 2004. Reason for 
selection of only top 10 import items is to see the movement of transaction costs in high value 
imports. Incidentally, in all the pairs, top 10 items cover above 30 percent of total imports of 
that country from its partner, which even gone above 50 percent in 2004. 
 
Table 4 (a, b) reports China’s top 10 import items (at HS 4) from Korea and Japan and 
corresponding tariffs and transaction costs for 2001 and 2004. Even though China’s weighted 
average tariff has declined in 2004, compared to 2001, transaction costs of her imports from 
Korea has gone up in most of the items at the top 10 category, whereas the same for her 
imports from Japan has seen some improvements in most of the top 10 products in 2004. For 
example, China imports electronic integrated circuits and micro-assemblies (HS 8542) in 
large volume from both Korea and Japan. In fact, electronic integrated circuits and micro-
assemblies alone share 13.45 percent of China’s total import from Korea and 9.69 percent of 
her total import from Japan in 2004. Electronic integrated circuits and micro-assemblies are 
used as intermediate products in electronics and electrical industry in China, which thereby 
influence global market as China has considerably good share in global exports of electronics 
and electrical products. Looking at its high scale use and value addition in the country, 
Chinese government has completely withdrawn import tariffs on HS 8542. However, 
associated transaction costs of import of this item from Korea and Japan are too high; more 
than 200 percent is found to be as transaction costs for her import of this product from Korea 
and the same was around 90 percent for her import from Japan in 2004. Similarly, China 
imports liquid crystal devices (HS 9013) from both Korea and Japan, which almost share 
13.33 percent of China’s total imports from Korea and 3 percent of her total imports from 
Japan in 2004. These have been used as intermediate items in telecommunication, electronics 
and electrical industry. However, the cost of import of liquid crystal devices (HS 9013) from 
Korea is found to be three times higher than the import of the same from Japan.  
 
Therefore, while the policy barriers (e.g. tariff) have been reduced, environmental barriers are 
very much in existence due to which prices of the finished products are becoming higher. In 
general, top 10 Chinese imports from Korea are associated with 0 to 10 percent tariffs and 7 
to 304 percent transaction costs, whereas the same for China’s imports from Japan are 
associated with 0 to 35 percent tariffs and 2 to 123 percent transaction costs, respectively.  
 
In case of Japan’s imports from China (Table 5(a)), most of the top 10 items except apparels 
and readymade garments, and electrical wire and cables (HS 8544) face no tariff barrier but 
carry high transaction costs. Total aggregate costs (tariff + transaction) are high in case of 
import of apparel and ready made garments (HS 6110, 6204, 6203) and insulated wire and 
cable (HS 8544) from China. Virtually, no policy barrier (in terms of tariff) exists in Japan on 
imports of high value – high end items (electronics and electrical intermediate and finished 
products) from China, but environmental barriers, due to structural differences in the logistics 
and support services, often make the landed price of imports much higher. In case of Japan’s 
imports from Korea (Table 5(b)), all the top 10 Korean products except petroleum oil, other 
than crude (HS 2710) faced no tariffs in 2004. In general, aggregate average transaction costs 
of Japan’s import from Korea is much less than her import from China appearing mainly due 
to Korea’s location and improved transportation facilities of the two countries, compared to 
China. Therefore, Japan’s imports from Korea face lesser constraints than her imports from 
China. In other words, due to favourable policy (tariff) and environment (improved trade 
infrastructure), Japan’s welfare gain from her imports from Korea and China seems to be 
much higher. To some extent, it may also be said that trade environment in Japan is far open 
and competitive, compared to Korea and China.  
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Table 4(a): Transaction Costs of China’s Import from Korea: Top 10 Products 
HS 
 












2710  Oils petroleum, bituminous, distillates, except crude  7.32  8.80  9.98 
8542  Electronic integrated circuits and microassemblies  6.08  5.97  416.60 
8540  Thermionic and cold cathode valves and tubes  4.98  12.39  18.91 
2917 Polycarboxylic  acid,  derivatives  3.08  11.08  11.33 
3901  Polymers of ethylene, in primary forms  3.02  16.00  17.08 
3903  Polymers of styrene, in primary forms  2.84  16.00  91.14 
2902 Cyclic  hydrocarbons  2.51  7.94  6.16 
5407  Woven synthetic filament yarn, monofilament >67dtex  2.50  29.95  83.53 
4104  Bovine or equine leather, no hair, not chamois, patent  2.16  8.55  36.66 
7219  Rolled stainless steel sheet, width > 600mm  2.13  12.17  13.06 
Year: 2004 
8542  Electronic integrated circuits and microassemblies.  13.45  0.00  214.50 
9013 Liquid  crystal  devices  13.33  8.44  304.14 
8529  Parts suitable for use with the apparatus of headings 85.25 to 85.28  4.80  5.37  * 
2710  Petroleum oils, other than crude  4.40  6.55  10.89 
2917  Polycarboxylic acids, their anhydrides  3.03  8.24  6.56 
2902 Cyclic  hydrocarbons.  2.66  2.99  * 
7219  Flat-rolled products of stainless steel, of a width of 600 mm or more.  2.50  4.93  11.31 
8473  Parts and accessories for use with machines of heading 84.69 to 84.72  2.20  0.02  * 
8540  Thermionic, cold cathode or photo-cathode valves and tubes  1.95  8.24  19.96 
3903  Polymers of styrene, in primary forms.  1.87  10.10  31.61 
 
 
Table 4(b): Transaction Costs of China’s Import from Japan: Top 10 Products 
HS 
 












8542  Electronic integrated circuits and microassemblies  9.35  5.98  168.63 
8479  Machines nes having individual functions  3.10  14.55  46.31 
8541  Diodes, transistors, semi-conductors, etc  2.73  10  106.75 
8473  Parts, accessories, except covers, for office machines 2.46  9.01 47.22 
8708  Parts and accessories for motor vehicles  1.83 26.6 4.85 
8529  Parts for radio, tv transmission, receive equipment 1.63  13.46  49.18 
5407  Woven synthetic filament yarn, monofilament >67dtex  1.46  29.98  7.04 
8522  Parts, accessories of audio, video recording equipment 1.44  32.3  123.32 
7210  Flat-rolled iron/steel, >600mm, clad, plated or coated  1.40  9.9  92.10 
8536  Electrical switches, connectors, etc, for < 1kV  1.28  11.98  39.70 
Year: 2004 
8542  Electronic integrated circuits and microassemblies.  9.69  0.00  88.01 
8479  Machines and mechanical appliances having individual functions  3.88  1.05  25.60 
8541  Diodes, transistors and similar semiconductor devices  3.33  0.00  88.85 
8529  Parts suitable for use with the apparatus of headings 85.25 to 85.28  3.23  5.36  48.69 
9013 Liquid  crystal  devices  3.00  8.17  100.53 
8473  Parts and accessories for use with machines of heading 84.69 to 84.72  2.78 0.11 20.85 
8708  Parts and accessories of the motor vehicles of headings 87.01 to 87.05.  2.63 14.91 4.50 
2902 Cyclic  hydrocarbons.  1.81  3.00  1.62 
8703 








8532  Electrical capacitors, fixed, variable or adjustable (pre-set).  1.49  0.00  123.30 
Notes: 1. Share in country’s total import from partner. 2. Weighted average MFN tariff applied to the partner. 3. 
Transaction costs of import from partner country. * Not possible to compute due to discrepancy in trade data 
Source: Calculated based on WB WITS and UN COMTRADE, sourced using KIEP’s online access. 
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Table 5(a): Transaction Costs of Japan’s Import from China: Top 10 Products 
HS 
 











Year : 2001 
6110  Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans, waist-coats and sim  3.70  12.11  82.50 
6204  Women's or girls' suits, ensembles, jackets, blaze 3.27  11.98  11.94 
8471  Automatic data processing machines and units there  2.70  0.00  27.13 
6203  Men's or boys' suits, ensembles, jackets, blazers,  2.29  12.16  * 
4202  Trunks, suit-cases, vanity-cases, executive-cases,  2.15  9.26  90.17 
8473  Parts and accessories (other than covers, carrying 1.80  0.00  228.31 
8504  Electrical transformers, static converters (for ex  1.70  0.00  47.71 
8529  Parts suitable for use solely or principally with   1.65  0.00  * 
2701  Coal; briquettes, ovoids and similar solid fuels   1.63  0.00  10.33 
6109  T-shirts, singlets and other vests, knitted or  0.00  11.03  * 
Year : 2004 
8471  Automatic data processing machines and units thereof  8.90  0.00  30.75 
6110  Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans, waist-coats and similar articles, knitted or .  3.71  10.67  90.24 
8473  Parts and accessories for use with machines of heading 84.69 to 84.72  3.21 0.00  76.57 
6204  Women's or girls' suits, ensembles, jackets, blazers, dresses, skirts 2.79  9.81  15.43 
8529  Parts suitable for use with the apparatus of headings 85.25 to 85.28  1.89  0.00  17.97 
2701  Coal; briquettes, ovoids and similar solid fuels manufactured from coal.  1.86  0.00  20.39 
6203  Men's or boys' suits, ensembles, jackets, blazers, trousers  1.80  10.08  * 
4202  Trunks, suit-cases, vanity-cases, executive-cases, brief-cases  1.79  9.21  130.64 
8544  Insulated (including enamelled or anodised) wire, cable  1.51  2.49  72.00 
8504  Electrical transformers, static converters (for example, rectifiers) etc.  1.50  0.00  33.62 
 
 
Table 5(b): Transaction Costs of Japan’s Import from Korea: Top 10 Products 
HS 
 












2710  Oils petroleum, bituminous, distillates, except crude  16.56  2.89  * 
8542  Electronic integrated circuits and micro assemblies  12.81  0.00  34.53 
8471  Automatic data processing machines (computers)  7.09  0.00  8.24 
8473  Parts, accessories, except covers, for office machines 3.07  0.00  * 
0303 Fish,  frozen,  whole  1.71  3.87  5.02 
8525  Radio and TV transmitters, television cameras  1.58  0.00  34.21 
8522  Parts, accessories of audio, video recording equipment 1.53  0.00  81.23 
7208  Hot-rolled products, iron/steel, width>600mm, not clad  1.51  1.27  3.00 
0307 Molluscs  1.23  6.92  * 
8480  Moulds for metals (except ingot), plastic, rubber, etc  1.01  0.00  * 
Year: 2004 
8542  Electronic integrated circuits and micro assemblies.  15.62  0.00  16.01 
2710  Petroleum oils, other than crude  12.49  2.93  * 
8473  Parts and accessories for use with machines of heading 84.69 to 84.72  6.09 0.00  145.91 
8471  Automatic data processing machines and units thereof  2.60  0.00  * 
8529  Parts suitable for use with the apparatus of headings 85.25 to 85.28  2.36  0.00  * 
8525  Transmission apparatus for radio-telephony, radio-broadcasting  1.79  0.00  22.51 
7219  Flat-rolled products of stainless steel, of a width of 600 mm or more.  1.76  0.00  0.55 
7208  Flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel  1.58  0.00  0.44 
7209  Flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel  1.42  0.00  * 
2902 Cyclic  hydrocarbons.  1.34  0.00  * 
Notes: 1. Share in country’s total import from partner. 2. Weighted average MFN tariff applied to the partner. 3. 
Transaction costs of import from partner country. * Not possible to compute due to discrepancy in trade data 
Source: Calculated based on WB WITS and UN COMTRADE, sourced using KIEP’s online access. 
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Table 6(a): Transaction Costs of Korea’s Import from China: Top 10 Products 
HS 
 











Year : 2001 
2701  Coal, briquettes, ovoids etc, made from coal  6.65  1.00  9.18 
8473  Parts, accessories, except covers, for office machines 3.75  8.00  193.96 
8471  Automatic data processing machines (computers)  3.22  0.00  32.37 
8504  Electric transformers,static converters and rectifiers  3.02  8.00  59.88 
2710  Oils petroleum, bituminous, distillates, except crude  2.44  8.00  5.53 
6110  Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans, etc, knit or crochet  2.43  13.00  * 
8529  Parts for radio, tv transmission, receive equipment 2.41  8.00  20.23 
0303 Fish,  frozen,  whole  2.28  10.00  1.83 
1005 Maize  (corn)  2.25  0.00  * 
6203  Mens or boys suits, jackets, trousers etc not knit  2.01  13.00  7.25 
Year : 2004 
8471  Automatic data processing machines and units thereof  4.69  8.00  * 
2701  Coal; briquettes, ovoids and similar solid fuels manufactured from coal.  4.67  1.00  * 
8542  Electronic integrated circuits and microassemblies.  3.48  8.00  * 
8473  Parts and accessories for use with machines of heading 84.69 to 84.72  3.18  8.00  * 
7208  Flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel  2.97  8.00  * 
7601 Unwrought  aluminium.  2.95  3.00  * 
8504  Electrical transformers, static converters (for example, rectifiers) etc.  2.33  8.00  24.03 
8531  Electric sound or visual signalling apparatus  1.88  8.00  11.14 
8529  Parts suitable for use with the apparatus of headings 85.25 to 85.28  1.84  8.00  22.16 
8543  Electrical machines and apparatus with individual functions  1.76  8.00  27.73 
 
Table 6(b): Transaction Costs of Korea’s Import from Japan: Top 10 Products 
HS 
 











Year : 2001 
8542  Electronic integrated circuits and microassemblies  9.93  8.00  16.27 
8479  Machines nes having individual functions  4.04  8.00  20.15 
7208  Hot-rolled products, iron/steel, width>600mm, not clad  3.78  8.00  13.15 
8541  Diodes, transistors, semi-conductors, etc  2.75  8.00  10.23 
8529  Parts for radio, tv transmission, receive equipment 2.33  8.00  50.01 
8708  Parts and accessories for motor vehicles 2.24  8.00  9.32 
2902 Cyclic  hydrocarbons  1.76  5.00  * 
8471  Automatic data processing machines (computers)  1.71  0.00  76.89 
9001  Optical fibres, lenses, mirrors, prisms, etc  1.50  8.00  * 
8473  Parts, accessories, except covers, for office machines 1.40  8.00 23.50 
Year : 2004 
8542  Electronic integrated circuits and microassemblies.  7.66  8.00  * 
8479  Machines and mechanical appliances having individual functions  5.84  8.00  * 
7208  Flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel  4.73  8.00  8.78 
8529  Parts suitable for use with the apparatus of headings 85.25 to 85.28  2.41  8.00  * 
8541  Diodes, transistors and similar semiconductor devices  2.27  8.00  * 
9001  Optical fibres and optical fibre bundles  1.98  8.00  * 
8543  Electrical machines and apparatus, having individual functions  1.97  8.00  * 
9010 




8.00  1.93 
 
7204  Ferrous waste and scrap; remelting scrap ingots of iron or steel.  1.84  1.00  8.19 
2902 Cyclic  hydrocarbons.  1.73  5.00  1.84 
Notes: 1. Share in country’s total import from partner. 2. Simple average MFN tariff applied to the partner. 3. 
Transaction costs of import from partner country. * Not possible to compute due to discrepancy in trade data. 
Source: Calculated based on WB WITS and UN COMTRADE, sourced using KIEP’s online access.   18
On contrary, compared to China and Japan, Korea’s trade environment is more restrictive. 
Most of electrical and electronics import items (HS 8542, 8543, 8529) from China and Japan 
face import tariffs of average 8 percent and also relatively higher transaction costs. In 
general, due to Korea’s distance advantage and its relatively better-endowed transportation 
facilities, cost of imports from Japan is much lower than her imports from China (see, Table 
7). However, Korea’s relatively high tariffs are offsetting its welfare gain arising from her 
improved trade infrastructure and its strategic location in the region.  
 
























Notes: 1. Pooled data for the period 1991 to 2004. 2. Tariffs and TC are based on bilateral 
trading pairs.  
 
Therefore, what follows is that regional trade is increasingly taking place in intermediate 
goods in Northeast Asia, which are used in regional and global production processes. The 
price of the vast majority of traded goods is thus not necessarily exogenous (appears to be), 
particularly in case of China and Korea in the Northeast Asia. Indirectly, as Tables 4, 5, and 6 
indicate, the shipping of imports has become more expensive. Table 7 is also further 
confirmed this. Since rise in shipping costs being directly related with higher inflation ensues 
as a result of the increased cost of imported goods, and in the case of intermediate and capital 
goods, this also increases the costs of local production. Econometric estimates suggest that the 
doubling of an individual country’s transaction costs leads to a drop in its trade of 80 percent 
or even more (Hummels, 1999; Limao and Venables, 2001). So, lowering transaction costs is 
very much important to raise competitiveness of finished goods, particularly in case of 
Northeast Asia. Trade in intermediate goods requires JIT (just-in-time) deliveries of inputs. 
JIT in turn requires a particularly sophisticated and efficient transport system, which tends to 
be widely asymmetric in terms of services across the three countries in Northeast Asia.  
 
Therefore, transaction costs have profound influence on trade. In our case, we found that 
average incidence of transaction costs seems to exceed that of tariffs over 1991 to 2004 
(Figure 5), indirectly pointing towards the fact that trade and transport services are ever more 
closely linked with one another: to attain higher trade one need to improve its trade services. 
But does that relationship exogenously determined or can they be influenced by policy? This 
has been dealt in the next section in the framework of a partial equilibrium model.  
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Table 7: Trends in Shipping Rates in Northeast Asia
1 
Ocean freight  Other charges
2  Total 






  (US$ per container) 
Japan China  250.00  275.00  178.02  223.11  428.02  498.11 
China  Japan  900.00  800.00 162.32 365.90 1062.32 1165.90 
Japan Korea  300.00  275.00  238.35  288.68  538.35  563.68 
Korea   Japan  300.00  400.00  218.25  262.25  518.25  662.25 
Korea   China  250.00  350.00  202.89  220.33  452.89  570.33 
China Korea  300.00  500.00  190.43  239.86  490.43  739.86 
Notes: 1. For shipment of a 20’ container (TEU). 2. Including container handling charges, 
documentation fees, government taxes and levies, etc. of both the trading partners. 
Source: Calculated based on Maersk Sealand (2006).  
 
5. Impact of Trade Costs on Regional Trade: Estimation Results  
 
Having discussed the interdependence of Northeast Asian countries in trade, let us turn to see 
the impact of trade costs on bilateral trade with the help of the fixed effect panel regression.
31 
To assess such impact, as described in Section 3, we have used an augmented gravity model 
(equation 4). The explanatory variable of interest is transaction cost. We expect that the 
transaction cost is negatively correlated with the volume of imports. Endogeneity may still be 
a problem since relatively high imports within the region may lead to better or worse trade 
facilitation. To check the endogeneity, we use no of ports engaged in trade in bilateral pair as 
instrument. The reason (rather intuition) is lack of adequate port slows down trade facilitation, 
but it is not a result of trade volumes. The LSDV estimates are provided in Table 8.  
 
The gravity model performs well as most of the variables do have expected signs. As 
variables are used in natural logarithms, estimated coefficients show elasticity. All the models 
(1 to 7) explain 86 to 91 percent of the variations in direction of trade flows. The volume of 
imports is increasing in GDP and deceasing in the distance. The most interesting result is the 
strong influence that transaction costs had on trade: the higher the transaction cost between 
each pair of partners, the less they trade. Therefore, reduction in transactions costs between 
the trading partners will certainly raise trade by a very large proportion. As can be seen from 
Table 8, coefficients of transaction costs in all the cases are statistically significant at 5 
percent level and always negative.  
 
Models 2 to 7 report the results including remoteness. Coefficients of remoteness and distance 
are interchangeably significant with unchanged signs. It may be said that while distance has 
clear negative effect on imports, trade in Northeast Asia does not suffer much from 
remoteness from rest of the world. Coefficients of remoteness are positive and slightly 
                                                 
31 A limited discussion on selection of model in present context is required. We consider both 
“individuality” of each country as well as “time” in fixed effects regression (or what is known Least-
Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) regression). In other word, LSDV model tells us that intercept 
varies for each country and/or time but slope coefficients are constant across countries. This model is 
applied taking in account balanced panel data as described in Section 3. Selection of LSDV model over 
OLS was based on values of restricted F test using LIMDEP 7.0. In all such tests (OLS vs. LSDV), 
restricted F values were found highly significant and therefore OLS was found to be invalid in this 
study. While dealing with fixed effect model (FEM) vs. random effect model (REM), we have carried 
out Hausman (1978) specification test with the help of STATA 8.0 for all the reported models in this 
paper. In all cases, chi-sq. values were found to be significant, and thus we selected FEM (and not the 
REM) to assess the impact of trade costs on trade with following caveat. As reported in Park (2005), all 
the panel estimates were carried out in LIMDEB 7.0 and not in STATA 8.0 for two reasons: (i) 
STATA 8.0 can not run two-way fixed effect, and (b) R
2 reported in STATA 8.0 fixed effect (within) 
model is incorrect. To save space, we have omitted placing all these test results in this paper. Interested 
readers may contact the author for the same.    20
significant in only three cases. This in other word endorses the importance of ‘nearness’ in 
Northeast Asia. This is a great advantage for the Northeast Asian countries to achieve higher 
intraregional trade and mobility of labour and capital by removing common borders.
32  
 
Table 7: Effect of Transaction Costs on Trade: Least Square Estimates
 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
2.803** 1.991** 2.700** 2.144** 2.607** 2.621**  1.957**  Importing countries 
GDP  (5.409) (3.349) (5.096) (3.166) (4.715) (4.738)  (3.339) 
2.528** 2.333** 2.262** 2.683** 2.511** 2.697**  2.232**  Exporting countries 
GDP  (4.766) (4.537) (4.180) (4.633) (5.304) (5.286)  (4.797) 
1.093 1.086    0.907 0.062 0.935 0.696  Importing countries 
GDP per capita  (1.747) (1.021)    (0.748) (0.095) (0.846)  (1.039) 
1.168 1.935*    1.724* 0.467 0.504  1.981*  Exporting countries 
GDP per capita  (1.780) (2.761)    (2.162) (1.268) (1.361)  (2.874) 
0.458 0.270 0.035  -0.403    0.567    Importing countries 
trade infrastructure  (0.898) (0.474) (0.094)  (-0.621)    (0.979)   
0.643 1.264* 0.038 -0.774      1.320*  Exporting countries 
trade infrastructure  (1.308) (2.371) (0.133)  (-1.304)      (2.554) 
0.007 0.271  0.359 0.339 0.271 0.555 0.129  Importing countries 
openness  (0.015) (0.556) (0.897) (0.610) (0.682) (1.128)  (0.338) 
-0.603 -0.924 -0.115 -0.458 -0.062 -0.081 -0.953  Exporting countries 
openness  (-1.154) (-1.787)  (-0.315) (-0.794) (-0.159) (-0.208) (-1.867) 
-0.146** -0.149** -0.141**    -0.132** -0.131** -0.150** 
Transaction costs  (-3.991) (-4.266) (-3.829)    (-3.708) (-3.698)  (-4.328) 
-0.086 -0.202 -0.009 -0.329 -0.026 -0.076 -0.162 
Tariff  (-0.489) (-1.153)  (-0.054) (-1.667) (-0.184) (-0.436) (-1.063) 
0.088 -0.272  -0.416*  -0.261  -0.341  -0.563  -0.158  Importing countries 
exchange rate  (0.237)  (-0.705)  (-2.404) (-0.592) (-1.118) (-1.481) (-0.527) 
0.058 -0.442  -0.498*  -0.433  -0.129  -0.170  -0.488  Exporting countries 
exchange rate  (0.155)  (-1.139)  (-2.704) (-0.978) (-0.431) (-0.564) (-1.305) 
 2.751*  0.455  2.556*  0.797  1.514  2.480* 
Remoteness   (2.479)  (1.118)  (2.020)  (1.125)  (1.486)  (2.625) 
-4.913* -2.511 -6.469**  -2.904 -5.674**  -6.296** -2.063 
Distance  (-2.289) (-1.105)  (-3.442) (-1.121) (-3.643) (-3.742) (-1.005) 
Adjusted R
2  0.903 0.911  0.901 0.885 0.904 0.904 0.913 
No  of  Observations  1176 1260  1092 1176 1092 1176 1176 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. * Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent 
level. ***Significant at the 1 percent level. #Country fixed effects are included. $Results are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity. 
 
Next important factor is GDP of both exporting and importing countries. But this is a rather 
common phenomenon as we are dealing with aggregate behaviours. The negative but 
insignificant coefficients of tariffs in all the models indicate that further tariff liberalisation 
will not much enhance the regional trade in Northeast Asia. While exporting country’s 
openness has appeared with negative signs in all the models, the same in case of importing 
country has come out with positive signs, but none is significant. It may be said that country’s 
openness has never appeared as significant barrier primarily because of existence of two main 
factors: (i) existence of low tariff rates among the countries considered here, and (ii) Korea 
and China’s comparatively higher dependence on foreign trade so that absence of any 
counter-factual variation in the dataset could not make the statistical test going in favour of 
‘openness’. 
                                                 
32 By removing common borders between Germany and Czech, and also between the United States and 
Mexico, substantial positive effects could be observed on predicted income per capita in the smaller 
countries; income per capita of Czech and Mexico have gone up by 26 percent and 27 percent 
respectively presumably as a result of integration (Redding and Venables, 2004).    21
On the other hand, exchange rates show a significant (at 10 percent level in model 3) negative 
effect on trade. All the models in Table 8 indicate that a lowering of the exchange rate 
fluctuations will have a stronger impact on trade. On the cynical side, one could say that 
actual volume of trade in the world is still a phenomenon which is driven more by exchange 
rate manipulation than by pure competitiveness (Krugman, 1994). 
 
Quite consistent with the behaviour of transaction cost, country’s trade mobility infrastructure 
produces positive signs with bilateral trade in all the models except in model 4. Coefficients 
of infrastructure (both importing and exporting countries) switch signs when we exclude 
transaction costs in model 4. The explanation behind this changeover sign is that in absence of 
trade infrastructure at border (both visible and invisible), such as trade facilitation measures, 
economic infrastructure (namely, railways, roadways, ports, airways and telecommunication 
facilities) will not produced desired results in enhancing trade in isolation. In other words, 
strengthening trade facilitation measures at border as well as economic (internal) 
infrastructure should go together. Separating the two will not enhance trade since collection 
and/or distribution of the goods inside the country is equally important as like as facilitating 
the trade at border.  
 
Table 9: Effect of Transaction Costs on Trade: 2-Stage Least Square Estimates 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
1.254**  1.407** 1.190** 1.550** 0.891** 
Importing countries GDP  (3.264) (5.952) (3.288)  (4.210)  (2.342) 
1.025**  1.154** 0.990** 1.148** 0.868** 
Exporting countries GDP  (4.342) (5.838) (4.362)  (5.046)  (3.693) 
0.427   0.987*  -0.122  1.416*  Importing countries GDP per 
capita  (0.581)  (2.258)  (-0.189)  (2.704) 
0.193   0.699**  0.672**  0.044  Exporting countries GDP per 
capita  (0.439)  (4.460)  (4.284)  (0.100) 
0.483  0.639**   0.611   Importing countries trade 
infrastructure  (1.591) (3.122)    (1.994)   
0.512 0.635**      0.692  Exporting countries trade 
infrastructure  (1.116) (3.782)      (1.511) 
-0.090 -0.176 0.100 -0.152 0.113  Importing countries 
openness  (-0.310) (-0.626) (0.340) (-0.472) (0.396) 
-0.626 -0.753* -0.437 -0.317 -0.820  Exporting countries 
openness  (-1.403)  (-2.612) (-1.444) (-1.012) (-1.960) 
-0.150**  -0.149** -0.139** -0.139** -0.153** 
Transaction costs  (-4.194)  (-4.447) (-4.010) (-4.203) (-4.203) 
-0.059  -0.021 -0.094 -0.148 -0.011 
Tariff  (-0.422)  (-0.189) (-0.864) (-1.339) (-0.083) 
-0.924**  -0.806** -1.098** -0.849** -1.129**  Importing countries 
exchange rate  (-4.559)  (-7.531) (-6.354) (-4.288) (-6.399) 
-0.834**  -0.785** -0.971** -0.964** -0.794**  Exporting countries 
exchange rate  (-5.204)  (-6.491) (-6.365) (-6.553) (-4.717) 
0.280 -0.063 0.338  -0.514  1.171 
Remoteness  (0.308) (-0.177) (0.650)  (-0.862)  (1.439) 
-5.234**  -5.359** -6.031** -6.252** -4.719** 
Distance  (-4.486)  (-5.564) (-5.519) (-5.941) (-3.772) 
Instrument: No of seaports 
for exports and imports in 
bilateral  pair  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2    0.878  0.880 0.875 0.878 0.877 
No  of  Observations  1176  1008 1008 1092 1092 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. * Significant at the 10 percent level. ** 
Significant at the 5 percent level. ***Significant at the 1 percent level. $ Results are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity   22
Next, we deal the 2-stage least square estimates (2SLS) which addresses more precisely the 
potential problem of omitted variable bias and endogeneity. The results are reported in Table 
9. In fact robustness of transaction costs has gone up in Table 9 by using instrumental 
variable. This result holds when we deal with the potential endogeneity of the variable 
transaction costs by using as instrument number of ports engaged in trade in bilateral pair. 
Transaction costs have statistically significant negative impact on the volume of imports. The 
coefficient of transaction costs increases in all the models reported in Table 9, compared to 
the same in Table 8, when we use instrumental variable. Therefore, result implies that 10 
percent saving in transaction costs increases imports by about 4 to 5 percent. Results are 
unchanged and robust when we include both the partners’ trade infrastructure in model 2, and 
interchangeably in models 4 and 5, respectively. Tariff, as usual, shows no significant impact 
on imports. Therefore, it also may be concluded that countries with relatively low trade 
infrastructure facilities have encountered with high transaction costs thereby offsetting the 
gain from higher trade.  
 
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
The analysis carried out in this paper place evidences to ascertain that today’s trade issues in 
Northeast Asia go beyond the traditional mechanisms of tariffs, and include “behind-the-
border” issues. The link between trade flows and trade costs has been based previously more 
on intuition than evidence, particularly in context of Northeast Asia. We found that variations 
in transaction costs along with trade infrastructure facilities have significant influence on 
regional trade flows in Northeast Asia. The rise in transaction cost is an outcome of the 
environment and policy constraints on the regional trade and infrastructure system.  
 
Our results have important implications for Northeast Asian countries seeking to expand 
trade. When the tariffs have come down heavily, the economies of this region could 
potentially benefit substantially from higher trade in Northeast Asia subject to (i) control of 
transaction costs, and (b) strengthening the chain of necessary trading infrastructure facilities, 
starting from the production point to the shipment point, and associated trade facilitation 
measures. The challenge for Northeast Asian countries is to identify improvements in 
logistics services and related infrastructure that can be achieved in the short-to-medium term 
and that would have a significant impact on competitiveness of these three countries.   
Therefore, policy protection should tend to complement natural protection, lowering the 
variability of trade costs. 
 
Tariffs tend to be lower not only in Northeast Asia but also across most of the economies in 
the world. Attention is being paid towards trade facilitation, to a varied extent, across the 
world. Generally speaking, tariffs are not regarded as major barriers to trade although high-
tariff items and tariff escalation still exist for certain sensitive products. With globalization of 
economic activities, business and trading communities—in particular, small and medium 
enterprises—pay greater attention to various government documentation requirements in 
order to reduce the cost of doing business. Studies by World Bank, OECD, UNCTAD, APEC 
and UNESCAP clearly show that documentary requirements are burdensome to the trading 
community, and that trade facilitation efforts will be more beneficial than trade 
liberalization.
33 Even though Customs Authorities in Northeast Asia have undergone 
significant reforms in recent years
34, particularly in Korea and Japan, one of the major reasons 
                                                 
33 To mention a few, Brooks et al (2005), Duval (2006) 
34 An efficient, friendly and corruption free customs can help boost trade and investment. Customs 
procedures between China and Korea have improved moderately in recent years since China began to 
actively develop its export trade but document processing is still largely manual and discourages the 
seamless flow of traffic.  With an objective to reduce border transaction time, China, Japan and Korea 
have successfully simplified administrative documentation, computerization of documents by 
connecting all custom points through electronic data interchange, paperless trading, alignment with   23
for high transaction costs in Northeast Asia, however, is time taking in cross-border trading 
procedures. Table 10 exemplifies this further. Requirement of export documentations in 
Northeast Asian countries is less, but it involves 20 to 11 days. It takes average 20 days when 
consignment is exported from China. Japan and Korea still take average 24 days to clear 
imports coming from China. Generally, a consignment needs several documentations, 
signatures, and copies for the final approval, taking into account both sides, and encounter 
multiple transhipments, resulting which costs are rising high day-by-day which often tends to 
change the composition and direction of trade.
 35 Sending a containerised cargo from China to 
Japan costs about US$ 1166 (in 2005), whereas the same from Japan to China costs only US$ 
498 (see, Table 7). Among the three, due to favourable policy (tariff) and environment 
(improved trade infrastructure), Japan’s welfare gain from her trade with Korea and China 
seems to be much higher.  
 























Japan China  5  11  498.11  7  11 
China Japan  6  20  1165.90  11  24 
Japan Korea  5  11  563.68  7  11 
Korea Japan  5  12  662.25  8  12 
Korea China  5  12  570.33  8  12 
China Korea  6  20  739.86  11  24 
World Average
2  7  30    11  37 
Asian Average
3  7  23    10  26 
Notes: 1. Cost including both the partners (taken from Table 7). 2. Includes 154 countries. 3. Includes 
ASEAN+6 countries except Brunei and Myanmar. 
Sources: 1. World Bank (2006b). 2. Maersk Sealand (2006) 
 
Needless to mention, procedural complexities coupled with high variability in shipping costs 
work as deterrent to trade in Northeast Asia. As noted in Table 10, even though performances 
of Northeast Asian countries in export facilitation (in terms of days and numbers) are 
comparatively better than the world and Asian averages, but the variability in case of imports 
facilitation between Northeast Asian countries and World and/or Asia is not much wide 
thereby indicating the need for further improvement of their trade facilitation performances.  
 
To move towards this direction, countries in Northeast Asia have to adopt a policy for 
lowering trade costs – not only for their trade in the region but also for the rest of the world. 
While doing so, their regional obligations need to match with their WTO commitments 
towards facilitation of trade. Adopting two different approaches towards trade facilitation 
(regional and multilateral) will not produce desired results and thus not recommended as trade 
                                                                                                                                            
international standards, pre-shipment inspection for all non-government imports, simplified tariff based 
on the Harmonized Code (8 digit); and red and green channels in major airports, seaports since 1999 
(APEC, 2005).  
35 The average lead time from port arrival to granting an import permit for all imported cargo in Japan 
has largely been reduced over the past 10 years. This reduction in the port distribution lead time has 
resulted in higher efficiency of operations for cargo owners, shipping companies and shipping 
forwarders, etc. The Customs and Tariff Bureau, Ministry of Finance of Japan, has so far implemented 
six time release surveys. According to the latest survey conducted in 2001, the average requisite time 
from port arrival to permit issuance for all imported cargo was 73.8 hours or 3.1 days, representing a 
major reduction compared with the lead time in the first survey in 1991 of 168.2 hours or 7.0 days 
(Government of Japan, 2004). Complex customs and tariff administration were also found as strong 
barriers to trade in Korea (Kim and Park, 2001). Refer, Table 2 of Sohn and Yang (2003) for further 
details.   24
is not restricted to a particular region and there is high interdependence among the economies 
across the world. 
 
In order to better inform policy-making process, future research should be undertaken to 
complement the findings of this paper in following ways. First, the focus of this study is on 
the importance of trade costs and trade facilitation in the context of Northeast Asia. Both the 
measures are very much aggregative in nature. So, future study should attempt to decompose 
the trade infrastructure index, and find the causal linkages of the variables with the trade flow 
separately. Second, the study has considered aggregate trade, transaction costs and tariffs in 
bilateral pairs. Future research should consider disaggregated data, at least at the HS 4-digit 
level, for trade costs and tariffs. Third, this paper has considered direct trade costs but omitted 
infrastructure costs. Variability in infrastructure endowments and costs thus need to be 
captured more accurately in the model provided the data is available. Finally, in order to find 
out the relative robustness of the transaction costs, one may need to replace the transaction 
costs assessment methodology adopted here by other method(s). 
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Appendix 1 
 
Sources of Data 
Particular Source 
Bilateral trade  UN COMTRADE 
IMF DOTS 
Bilateral tariff  WB WITS 
Korea Customs 
GDP, GDP per capita, surface area, population, 
openness, exchange rate 
WB WDI 2005 
Distance  Great circle distance, 
http://www.wcrl.ars.usda.go
v/cec/java/lat-long.htm 
Infrastructure variables: (i) railway length, (ii) 
road length, (iii) air transport freight, (iv) air 
transport passengers carried, (v) aircraft 
departures, (vi) container traffic, (vii) fixed line 
and mobile phone subscribers, (viii) internet 
users, and (ix) electric power consumption 
WB WDI 2005 
UNESCAP 
 
Shipping rates and number of ports   Maersk Sealand, Denmark, 
http://www.maerskline.com   26
Appendix 2 
 
(a) Trade Structure between China and Japan: Top 10 Commodities in 2004 
Value Share  Commodity 
Code 
 Commodity Description 
  (US$ billion)  (%) 
(a) Export 
HS 85 
Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; 
sound recorders etc.   13.10  17.82 
HS 84  Machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof  11.69  15.90 
HS 62 
Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not 
knitted or crocheted  7.55  10.27 
HS 61 
Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or 
crocheted 6.06  8.24 
HS 27 
Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their 
distillation 2.99  4.07 
HS 90 
Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, 
checking, precision, etc.  2.55  3.47 
HS 16  Preparations of meat, of fish or of crustaceans  2.18  2.97 
HS 94 
Furniture; bedding, mattresses, cushions and similar 
stuffed furnishing  1.61  2.19 
HS 63 
Other made up textile articles; sets; worn clothing and 
worn textile article, etc.  1.47  1.99 
HS 87  Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock  1.46  1.98 
(b) Import 
HS 85 
Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; 
sound recorders, etc.  28.33  30.04 
HS 84  Machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof  21.69  23.00 
HS 90 
Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, 
checking, precision, etc.  7.82 8.29 
HS 72  Iron and steel  5.58  5.92 
HS 39  Plastics and articles thereof  4.65  4.93 
HS 87  Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock  4.63  4.90 
HS 29  Organic chemicals  4.54  4.82 
HS 73  Articles of iron or steel  1.43  1.51 
HS 74  Copper and articles thereof  1.41  1.50 
HS 38  Miscellaneous chemical products  1.06  1.12 
Note: Consider China’s two-way trade with Japan 
Source: UN COMTRADE 
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 (b) Trade Structure between China and Korea: Top 10 Commodities in 2004 
Commodity 
Code 






  (a) Export    
HS-85 
Electrical machinery and equipment and 
parts thereof; sound recorders etc.  6.64  23.86 
HS-84 
Machinery and mechanical appliances; parts 
thereof 2.89  10.38 
HS-72  Iron and steel  2.53  9.10 
HS-27 
Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of 
their distillation  1.74  6.24 
HS-62 
Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, 
not knitted or crocheted  1.38  4.95 
HS-61 
Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, 
knitted or crocheted  1.33  4.78 
HS-76  Aluminium and articles thereof  0.97  3.48 
HS-03 
Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other 
aquatic invertebrates  0.85  3.06 
HS-29 Organic  chemicals  0.59  2.13 
HS-90 
Optical, photographic, cinematographic, 
measuring, checking, precision, etc.  0.58  2.10 
  (b) Import    
HS-85 
Electrical machinery and equipment and 
parts thereof; sound recorders, etc.  18.58  29.86 
HS-90 
Optical, photographic, cinematographic, 
measuring, checking, precision, etc.  9.18  14.76 
HS-84 
Machinery and mechanical appliances; parts 
thereof 6.89  11.07 
HS-29 Organic  chemicals  4.98  8.01 
HS-39  Plastics and articles thereof  4.88  7.83 
HS-72  Iron and steel  4.17  6.69 
HS-27 
Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of 
their distillation  3.21 5.16 
HS-87 
Vehicles other than railway or tramway 
rolling stock  1.50 2.42 
HS-74  Copper and articles thereof  0.86  1.38 
HS-54 Man-made  filaments  0.78  1.26 
Note: Consider China’s two-way trade with Korea 
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(c) Trade Structure between Korea and Japan: Top 10 Commodities in 2004 
Commodity 
Code 






  (a) Export    
HS-85 
Electrical machinery and equipment and 
parts thereof; sound recorders etc.  6.05  27.86 
HS-27 
Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of 
their distillation  3.39  15.60 
HS-84 
Machinery and mechanical appliances; parts 
thereof 2.77  12.76 
HS-72  Iron and steel  1.62  7.45 
HS-39  Plastics and articles thereof  0.87  4.01 
HS-29 Organic  chemicals  0.78  3.60 
HS-73  Articles of iron or steel  0.62  2.86 
HS-03 
Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other 
aquatic invertebrates  0.60  2.78 
HS-90 
Optical, photographic, cinematographic, 
measuring, checking, precision, etc.  0.52  2.37 
HS-87 
Vehicles other than railway or tramway 
rolling stock  0.34  1.57 
  (b) Import    
HS-85 
Electrical machinery and equipment and 
parts thereof; sound recorders etc.  12.30  26.65 
HS-84 
Machinery and mechanical appliances; parts 
thereof 8.57  18.57 
HS-72  Iron and steel  5.85  12.68 
HS-90 
Optical, photographic, cinematographic, 
measuring, checking, precision, etc.  4.81 10.42 
HS-29 Organic  chemicals  2.18  4.73 
HS-39  Plastics and articles thereof  2.18  4.72 
HS-38  Miscellaneous chemical products  1.28  2.76 
HS-87 
Vehicles other than railway or tramway 
rolling stock  1.02  2.21 
HS-70 Glass  and  glassware  0.74  1.61 
HS-27 
Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of 
their distillation  0.71  1.54 
Note: Consider Korea’s two-way trade with Japan 
Source: UN COMTRADE    29
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